European Integration: Challenge and Response. Crises as Engines of Progress in European Integration History. ZEI Discussion Papers C. 157, 2006 by Kühnhardt, Ludger.
European Integration:
Challenge and Response
Crises as Engines of Progress
in European Integration History
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Ludger Kühnhardt
C157
2006
D
i
s
c
u
s
s
i
o
n
P
a
p
e
r
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Straße 3
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
Tel.:
Fax:
http:
+49-228-73-4952
+49-228-73-1788
//www.zei.de
ISSN 1435-3288 ISBN 3-936183-57-0Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt, born 1958, is Director at the Center for 
European Integration Studies (ZEI). Between 1991 and 1997 he was 
Professor of Political Science at Freiburg University, where he also 
served as Dean of his Faculty. After studies of history, philosophy 
and political science at Bonn, Geneva, Tokyo and Harvard, 
Kühnhardt wrote a dissertation on the world refugee problem and a 
second thesis (Habilitation) on the universality of human rights. He 
was speechwriter for Germany’s Federal President Richard von 
Weizsäcker and visiting professor at various universities all over the 
world. 
His recent publications include: Europäische Union und föderale   
Idee, Munich 1993; Revolutionszeiten. Das Umbruchjahr 1989 im 
geschichtlichen Zusammenhang, Munich 1994 (Turkish edition 
2003); Von der ewigen Suche nach Frieden. Immanuel Kants Vision 
und Europas Wirklichkeit, Bonn 1996; Beyond divisions and after. 
Essays on democracy, the Germans and Europe, New York/Frankfurt 
a.M. 1996; (with Hans-Gert Pöttering) Kontinent Europa, Zurich 1998 
(Czech edition 2000); Zukunftsdenker. Bewährte Ideen politischer 
Ordnung für das dritte Jahrtausend, Baden-Baden 1999; Von 
Deutschland nach Europa. Geistiger Zusammenhalt und außenpoliti-
scher Kontext, Baden-Baden 2000; Constituting Europe. Identity, 
Institution-Building and the Search for a Global Role, Baden-Baden 
2003; Erweiterung und Vertiefung. Die Europäische Union im Neu-
beginn, Baden-Baden 2005. Ludger Kühnhardt 
European Integration: Challenge and 
Response 
Crises as Engines of Progress in European            
Integration History 
I. 
Given all aspects and developments of its current path, the European Union 
seems to discover its opportunities and encounters its global challenges in a 
way that reminds me of the work of Henry the Navigator in the 15
th cen-
tury: He sailed around Cape Bojador with hesitance, limited knowledge and 
caution, without clear goals and yet with curiosity to learn what might lie 
behind the Cape. In the 15
th century, Europe brought about the first wave of 
globalization. In the early 21
st century, it seems to be the other way around: 
Globalization seems to slowly bring about a new rationale for European 
integration as it forces the EU to learn faster, to look further and to come 
together more convincingly.
1  
This, however, seems to happen only through the medium of crises and the 
rhetoric of failure. Not only the EU’s foreign policy, as Jan Zielonka has so 
aptly shown with one of his fine publications, is full of paradoxes.
2 Obvi-
ously, most of European integration is driven by the dialectics of paradox 
 
1   See Ludger Kühnhardt, Implications of Globalization on the Raison d`Etre of Euro-
pean Integration, Oslo: ARENA, 2002. 
2   Jan Zielonka (ed.), Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, The Hague: Kluwer, 
1998. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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and crisis. The criteria to measure the degree of a crisis can only be found 
in the declared political objectives of the EU leadership as expressed in the 
subsequent series of treaties, in legislation and legal review by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice as well as in the declaratory ambitions related to EU 
Summitry and statements by the European Parliament. As for a concise 
definition of “crisis”, it seems appropriate to distinguish between “crisis of 
integration” and “crisis in integration”: While the first type of crisis is of a 
principal nature and challenges the very existence or at least the rationale 
of integration, the second type of crisis is related to difficulties in imple-
menting certain policy objectives or goals without implying that the failure 
in achieving any of these objectives could derail the integration process as 
such or unravel its rationale and legitimacy.
3  While I cannot contribute to a 
scientific model of how the European Union will react to presumptive fu-
ture crises, and while I will not deny the overstretch of crisis talk in media 
and academia - which seems mostly to be related to gaps between (subjec-
tive and objective) integration expectations and (subjective and objective) 
implementation failure – I suggest to add the notion of crises as engines of 
integration to our consensual list of lessons learned when studying Euro-
pean integration.
4 
My argument is divided into four parts. Firstly, I will introduce crisis as an 
engine of progress in European integration history and the concept of chal-
lenge and response as an explicatory variable. Secondly, I will offer some 
thoughts about a possible periodization of European integration history as 
far as the role and effect of the most defining crises and opportunities of 
 
3   I am grateful to Timothy Garton Ash for this suggestion to better clarify the under-
lying assumptions of my study. 
4   Some other lessons are already widespread, obvious and increasingly consensual: a) 
The relationship between “integration” and “European identity” has never been 
static     during the past five decades as some of those tend to suggest who are afraid 
of an EU that would be enlarged to the Balkans and to Turkey.; b )The relationship 
between “deepening” and “widening” has always turned out to be mutually rein-
forcing and not, as is sometimes suggested in the scholarly literature, mutually ex-
clusive; c) Finally, the debate about “supranationality” and “intergovernmentalism” 
has lost its fertility since the concept of multi-level governance in an unfinished 
federation of nation-states and Union citizens has been recognized as a new cate-
gory of academic reasoning about the nature of the EU. European Integration: Challenge and Response 
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integration are concerned. Thirdly, I will allude to some more examples of 
crises in integration pertinent to the comprehensive nature of my argument. 
Finally, I will briefly look into the interconnectedness between European 
integration crises and adaptation periods in transatlantic relations. 
When we reflect about the enabling forces of progress in European integra-
tion, we do it with a mixed bag of hope and fear, prejudice and compe-
tence. Some might think the answer is as easy as the squaring of a circle. 
But even then: Who moves the circle, and how does the squaring come 
about? As we know, it is only frogs that jump. All the rest of us, the Euro-
pean Union including, merely move, if at all. More than once, and some-
times very surprisingly, new dynamics in European integration has origi-
nated in dialectical processes, guided by the powerful and ironic law of un-
intended consequences.
5 Sometimes progress in European integration was 
the result of trial and error. More often, it came about not in spite, but be-
cause of crises. It seems to me that we could make more use of the classical 
concept of challenge and response - introduced by Arnold Toynbee in his 
seminal work on world history – in order to better understand and rational-
ize the often unimaginable and irrational, uninspiring or dubious, yet all in 
all highly successful course of European integration.  
The natural oscillation of European integration between failure and suc-
cess, or between challenge and response, represents what Toynbee called – 
in a completely different context - the “alternating rhythm of static and dy-
namic, of movement and pause and movement fundamental to the nature of 
the universe”
6. With a view on world history, Toynbee explained with great 
erudition that challenges instigate responses, which, of course, can either be 
appropriate or misleading. Depending on the nature of the response, chal-
lenges can lead to negative or even catastrophic consequences for the form 
they are related to. If the response to a challenge is appropriate and well 
 
5   See  Marlene Wind, Europe Towards a Post-Hobbesian Order?: A Constructivist 
Theory of European Integration, or How to Explain European Integration as an Un-
intended Consequence of Rational State-Action, Fiesole: European University Insti-
tute, 1996. 
6  Arnold Joseph Toynbee, Studies of History: Abridgement of Volumes I-VI, New 
York/London: Oxford University Press, 1947:51. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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focused, it will reinvigorate and strengthen the form it originates from or 
affects. Challenge and response are as interwoven as the notions of “to be” 
and “to become”. Toynbee argued about this relationship in the following 
words: “In the language of science we may say that the function of the in-
truding factor is to supply that on which it intrudes with a stimulus of the 
kind best calculated to evoke the most potently creative variations.”
7 Think 
about this in light of, for example, the negative referenda on the European 
constitution in France and in the Netherlands. In the end, they may not be 
the end of constitution-making, but its beginning with a different outcome. 
Hardly any other trendy social science theory, I fear, is better equipped to 
explain the meaning of crises, that is to say the many detours, rough roads 
and happy endings of European integration over the first fifty years. It sim-
ply has been and it remains a path of challenges and responses. In terms of 
integration theory, this tends to confirm constructivist over essentialist con-
cepts, rational institutionalism over functional determinism.
8 With this pa-
per, I do not want to add another interpretation of integration theory. I sim-
ply want to suggest that the meaning of crises in and for European integra-
tion has been under-researched and that we benefit from giving more 
thoughts to the medium- and long-term effects of crises.  
We do not know which type of crisis could be of such a fundamental nature 
that it might cause a terminal destruction of the European integration pro-
ject. We only know that so far, such a terminal crisis has not occurred. To 
the contrary, all crises of integration and all crises in integration have 
strengthened European integration in the end. Obviously, this view can be 
controversial, depending on the definition of crisis and crises, the relation 
between integration objectives and crisis interpretations, and between 
common interests and adaptation crises.   
To emphasize the meaning of challenge and response does not mean to say 
that the rationale of this process – or, to be more correct: of these processes 
– can be simplified and reduced to one explanatory variable. If this were 
 
7 Ibid.:  63. 
8  See Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Construction and European Integration”, in: Tho-
mas Christiansen et.al. (ed.), The Social Construction of Europe, London: Sage 
Publications, 2001: 50-64. European Integration: Challenge and Response 
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the case, we would become submissive to deterministic notions of history 
that surely run counter to social theory and anthropological evidence. Nev-
ertheless, it is not too far-fetched to conceptualize the history of European 
integration with the help of the constant variable of a permanent set of re-
sponses to contingently changing challenges. These responses are usually 
executed, of course, by a series of political processes with their genuine 
strategic and tactical logics. But these processes have always been instru-
mental and functional reactions to structural challenges for the European 
integration project. In short: I simply suggest that we add the logic of 
“challenge and response” and the idea of crises as catalysts for progress to 
the intellectual navigation system that can help us to comprehensively con-
ceptualize European integration, why it began and how it developed against 
all odds.
9 
 
9   In his small and concise book The Origins and Development of the European Union 
1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996:7-33) Martin Dedman describes the three 
most influential approaches to the theory of European integration, although it re-
mains questionable whether they can really be called “theories” or should rather be 
referred to as comprehensive assessments of analysis: 1.Functional theory that 
dominates contemporary Political Science. It assumes that an increase in interna-
tional cooperation and consequently in integration is the logical precondition for 
states to enhance their scope of action in the modern state system. The scholarly 
works of David Mitrany (A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Func-
tional Development of International Organization.  New York: Russel & Russel, 
Inc., 1943) and Ernst Haas (The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic 
Forces 1950-1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958) laid the ground for 
this most influential integration theory. 2. Ideological approaches refer to the 
growth and influence of European federalist movements in the interwar period and 
during World War II. The erudite work of Walter Lipgen’s (Documents on the His-
tory of European Integration, 2 Volumes, Berlin: New York: de Gruyter, 1985 and 
1986) has contributed the best possible insights into their quest for a new normative 
beginning in building a European order. 3. Historical-systematizing research has fo-
cused primarily on the period from the Treaties of Rome until the Treaty of Maas-
tricht. Alan Milward (The European Rescue of the Nation State, London: 
Routledge, 1992) in one of the most influential works of this nature has argued that 
integration occurs only when it is needed by the states that come together. Andrew 
Moravscik (The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Rome to 
Maastricht, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1998) has elaborated on the theme that 
European integration strengthened the European nation-states. Today, the main new 
focus deals with “Europeanization” and its transforming impact on both integration 
mechanisms on the EU level and national structures in all possible variants; see Ludger Kühnhardt 
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II. 
I turn to my second point. The most serious challenge to advance the notion 
of European integration stood at the very beginning. The destruction of 
Europe in two wars, the democratic revitalization of its Western part (West 
Germany including) with the help of America’s policy of enlightened self-
interest (Marshall Plan) and continuous strategic presence as a “European 
power”, but, not to forget, also the end of Europe’s global colonial power 
marked the beginning of Europe’s second renaissance.
10 As much as the 
first renaissance can best be understood by Leonardo da Vinci’s ambition 
to build a bridge wherever he saw a river and by Blaise Pascal’s fear in face 
of the dark open sky at night, Europe’s second renaissance was driven by 
hope and fear since its very beginning. 
If we were to take the liberty to categorize the first fifty years of European 
integration according to its most defining periods, we will inevitably stum-
ble into the dialectical nexus of challenge and response, of success through 
crisis. So far, in my mind, the two main defining periods that constitute and 
frame European integration as we know it today were related to substantial 
crises and worries: It is plausible to say that “1957” was the answer to the 
crisis (and opportunity) associated with “1945”. Less consensual is the idea 
that “2004” gave the structural answers to the opportunity (and crisis) of 
“1989”. Both defining periods were framed by the search for a rationale of 
European integration. Both periods of European integration were defined 
by quintessential external pressure, challenge and opportunity affecting the 
idea and implementation pattern on European integration. Both periods 
have received very different interpretations as far as their success and effect 
are concerned.  
 
Maria Green Cowles, et.al. (eds.), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Do-
mestic Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001; Kevin Featherstone and 
Claudio M. Radealli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2003. 
10  See David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas 
Empires, 1415-1980. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 
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Clearly, the Treaties of Rome and the creation of the European Economic 
Community in 1957 became the definite European responses to the end of 
World War II and the renaissance of parliamentary democracy in Western 
Europe after 1945.
11 As for 2004, the beginning unification of Europe 
through the unprecedented Eastward enlargement of the European Union 
and the signing of the first ever European Constitution in the same year are 
still open to final judgment and controversial in meaning and success. But 
there cannot be too much doubt that both the enlargement and the effort to 
constitutionalize the European Union must be considered as the honest re-
sponses of the EU leadership to the fall of the Iron Curtain and to the quest 
to combine parliamentary democracy and constitutional authority on the 
national level with democratic transparency, efficiency and accountability 
on the EU level. Enlargement and constitution-making were and deserve to 
be considered the necessary and logical consequence of the revolutionary 
changes of 1989
12 No matter the still unfinished business of enlargement to 
Southeastern Europe: 2004 was a pivotal year in the unification of Europe, 
setting the course that will continue for some time. And no matter the many 
disputes about the European Constitution and its eventual destiny: The 
signing of the document in 2004 by 25 European countries and, after all, its 
ratification, so far, by a majority of EU member states with a majority of 
Union citizens was a unique and revolutionary expression of the ongoing 
constitutionalization and politicization of the EU.
13 In a structural sense, 
 
11  See Wilfried Loth, Der Weg nach Europa: Geschichte der europäischen Integration, 
1939-1957, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1990. 
12  See Timothy Garton Ash, History of the Present: Sketches and Dispatches from 
Europe in the 1990s, London: Allen Lane, 2004; Ludger Kühnhardt, Revolutions-
zeiten: Das Umbruchjahr 1989 im geschichtlichen Zusammenhang, Munich: Olzog, 
1994.  
13  For the text see European Union, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
Luxembourg: Office for  Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005; 
see also Günter Bischof/Michael Gehler/Ludger Kühnhardt/ Rolf Steininger (eds.), 
Towards a European Constitution: A Historical and Political Comparison with the 
United States, Vienna: Böhlau, 2005; Marcus Höreth/Cordula Janowski/Ludger 
Kühnhardt (eds.), Die Europäische Verfassung: Analyse und Bewertung ihrer 
Strukturentscheidungen, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005; Yves Meny, “Making Sense 
of the EU: The Achievements of the Convention” in: Journal of Democracy, 
14(2003):57-70. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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2004 has become a long and yet unfinished year that will be subject to in-
teresting interpretations of historians once truly completed. As much as 
1989 did not begin in 1989, 2004 has not ended in 2004. 
Ironically, the rejection of the European Constitution by a majority of vot-
ers in France and in the Netherlands in 2005 has triggered the first public 
constitutional debate in Europe. The referenda in France and in the Nether-
lands have prolonged 2004, made its outcome more unpredictable and 
opened a new chapter in the European history of crises. They have also ac-
celerated new dimensions of European integration. For example, more than 
ever, the idea of a European wide referendum has been discussed across the 
EU.
14 Sometimes, this issue has become more important than the original 
matter of the constitution. It can therefore not be excluded that the ratifica-
tion crisis of the European Constitution might finally strengthen the Euro-
pean public sphere more than constructivist efforts to initiate a European 
demos under “good weather conditions”.
15 Should such a development be-
come a lasting reality, we would certainly have to talk about a new applica-
tion of the law of unintended consequences. For the time being, some 
scholars do already diagnose an emerging European constitutionalism 
without a Constitution.
16 The outcome of the ratification crisis is unclear at 
 
14  See Simon Hug, Voices of Europe: Citizens, Referendums and European Integra-
tion,  Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002; Frédéric Esposito, “The European Ref-
erendum: A Tool to Legitimate the European Integration Process?” in: Stuart Nagel 
(ed.), Policymaking and Democracy: A Multinational Anthology, Lanham: Lexing-
ton Books, 2003: 15-37. 
15   See Lars-Erik Cederman, Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would 
Take to Construct a European Demos, Fiesole: European University Institute, 2000. 
16  See Thomas Banchoff, and Mitchell P. Smith (eds), Legitimacy and the European 
Union: The Contested Polity, London/New York: Routledge, 1999; Berggren, Ni-
clas, and Nils Karlson, “Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction 
Costs,” in: Public Choice, 117.1/2 (2003): 99-124; Michiel Brand, Affirming and 
Refining European Constitutionalism: Towards the Establishment of the First Con-
stitution for the European Union, Fiesole: European University Institute, 2004; 
Frankenberg, Günter, “The Return of the Contract: Problems and Pitfalls of Euro-
pean Constitutionalism”, in:  European Law Journal 6.3 (2000): 257-276; Gersten-
berg, Oliver, “Expanding the Constitution Beyond the Court: The Case of Euro-
Constitutionalism”, in: European Law Journal 8.1 (2002): 172-194; Ingolf Pernice, 
“Multi-Level Constitutionalism in the European Union”, in: European Law Journal 
27.1/6(2002): 511-529. European Integration: Challenge and Response 
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this point. It is therefore wise to be on the safe side and argue with caution. 
But even then I may provoke by proposing that with hindsight knowledge 
we might one day come to accept the idea that, when all chips are down, 
the original founding of integrated Europe in 1957 was followed by a sec-
ond founding associated with the two big projects of 2004. 
In any case, the two critical periods of European integration between 1945 
and 1957 and between 1989 and 2004 (for the time being, more appropriate 
it is to say: 2004+?) cover and frame complex historical developments. If 
we look at these two defining periods in more detail, we will quickly agree 
that there has never been a linear connection between the intended begin-
ning of each of the processes and its ultimate set of outcomes. There has 
also never been definite clarity about the beginning and the end of a certain 
year as far as its political role and ramification were concerned. This, by 
the way, I should immediately add, was also true for most other minor or 
major periods and crises of European integration during the past five dec-
ades. The outcome of defining periods of European integration was similar 
to the outcome of many of the other important or less important interim 
crises of European integration. Most of them have always been resolved, so 
it seems, by a dialectical combination – at times with longer or shorter de-
tours – of seemingly mutually exclusive trends. And the outcome of inte-
gration crises, one might be surprised to realize, has time and again 
strengthened the rationale for integration and the form it has achieved. Is it 
really too far fetched to argue that in the end crises have always been 
Europe’s best and most reliable allies? 
This brings me to my third point. While the original creation of the Rome 
Treaties developed from European Economic Community into European 
Community and ultimately into European Union, it might be a comforting 
thought to conclude that all concurrent crises after 1957 were possible only 
because the original crisis post-1945 had been resolved the way it had: To 
resist Soviet expansion, and to do so under the security umbrella provided 
by the United States through NATO, had been the most daunting test of 
Europe’s resilience and its ability to reinvent itself after 1945, the incarna-
tion of Europe’s self-destruction. Neither 1957 nor any other year ever 
since constituted the end of European history or, in fact, of integration cri-Ludger Kühnhardt 
12   
ses. To the contrary, the most serious among these crises marked the most 
relevant turning points in European integration history over the past five 
decades. One might say: There has never been more European integration 
history than in the context or aftermath of crises to an original proposal. 
Here are some of the most obvious examples underlining my thesis: 
•  The crisis that broke out after the French National Assembly refused to 
ratify the European Defense Community in 1954 that France itself had 
launched two years earlier. Its ultimate solution was the creation of the 
European Economic Community in 1957. 
•  The failure to proceed with concepts of political integration after the 
governments of the six member states refused the proposals for political 
integration expressed in two Fouchet plans in 1961 and 1962 that they 
had commissioned themselves. Its ultimate answer was a set of treaty 
revisions during the 1980s and 1990s establishing a pre-constitution for 
the EU. 
•  The Luxemburg compromise which brought France back into the EEC 
institutions in 1965 after la grande nation had left the EEC tables over 
disputes on agricultural policies that had been initiated by France itself. 
Its ultimate effect, as slow as it turned out to be, was the gradual recog-
nition of majority voting and the primacy of EU law even by the most 
rigid proponents of national sovereignty. 
•  The failure of the EEC to immediately implement the “Werner Plan” of 
1970 that outlined the paths towards monetary union and a common cur-
rency over the decade of the 1970s. It took new currency crises during 
the 1980s and 1990s to achieve the introduction of the EURO as ulti-
mate response to the challenges outlined by Werner. 
•  The refusal of the Maastricht Treaty by the majority of Danes in a refer-
endum in 1992 was considered to be the end to all hopes of a political 
union. The ultimate solution to this crisis was the pragmatic “invention” 
of dubious “opting out-clauses” for Denmark that helped to bring the 
majority of Danes back on the path of integration by way of sending 
them to the voting booth a second time. European Integration: Challenge and Response 
  13
•  The crisis over constitution-making that was brought about by the EU 
Heads of States and Governments in December 2003 when they were 
unable to find agreement on the draft Constitutional Treaty, which the 
Constitutional Convention had presented to them in June 2003. The ul-
timate response to this crisis came in mid-2004 after postponing the de-
cision for half a year. These six months were used to invent face-saving 
compromises, although they were not more uplifting than any compro-
mise could have been already half a year earlier. In the end, this was 
also the result of the controversial budget negotiations in 2005/2006, ul-
timately a mere hiccup in light of the overall integration history. 
•  Finally, the ratification crisis of the European constitution. The ultimate 
answer to this crisis will probably only come about if the EU will again 
be defined from its opportunities and not only from its limits as has been 
the case so often during the last years. With or without a constitution, it 
should not be implausible that in the end the EU might get out of this 
crisis with a new sense of direction and a strengthened European public 
sphere.  
Whenever there is a light at the end of a tunnel, we can be certain that 
somebody in the European Union will prolong the tunnel. Nevertheless, the 
tunnel is built and we all as EU citizens, or at least our political elites, drive 
through it, often better guided by the lights we have already passed than by 
new visions or convincing leadership and yet confident that the way out is 
as solid as the hope that brought us into the tunnel in the first place. The 
rationale of “la longue durée” of the European integration process remains 
valid, after all:  Building a Europe whole and free, based on democratic 
principles, defending human rights, supporting a market economy with 
strong elements of welfare state solidarity, gradually combining economic 
with political union and reconstructing global responsibility and respect for 
multilateralism in international politics with the United States as Europe’s 
most indispensable partner. In short: Contributing to a free world in which 
the European Union (like democracy), as Timothy Garton Ash has re-Ludger Kühnhardt 
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minded us, “is not an end in itself. It is a means to higher ends.”
17 In an-
other sequence of his great, uncompromising and thoughtful new book 
“Free World” he explained the gist of Europe’s experience with freedom 
and the obligation emanating from it: “This enlargement of freedom is the 
great success story of Europe over the sixty years since the Second World 
War. It also provides a central purpose for the next twenty years.”
18 The 
same holds true for European integration. The only question I would add: 
Why only for the next twenty years, which coincides with our personal re-
tirement, but not with the life expectancy of our children? 
III. 
It is interesting to note – to add my fourth thought – that the most important 
crises and turning points in European integration have been linked, one 
way or the other, to fundamental developments and adaptation crises in 
transatlantic relations. At first, the period from 1949 (the founding of 
NATO) until 1957 (the signing of the Rome Treaties) was crucial to create 
what we have learned to call “the West”. Then and still ongoing, the second 
turning times of European integration between 1989 and the long and (in 
2006) continuing year 2004 have been intrinsically linked to important 
transformations in transatlantic relations. It would be a simplification to 
believe that the first defining period in building a common Atlantic civili-
zation was one of pure harmony, while the second defining period will go 
into history merely as one of transatlantic divorce. From the Berlin block-
ade to the Suez crisis, the transatlantic record of the 1940s and 1950s has 
been mixed. So was the record during the period marked by the outbreak of 
four Wars of Yugoslavian Succession, two Iraq wars and, after all, the 
unique enlargement of NATO and efforts to define the transformation of 
the Greater Middle East as the new transatlantic project.
19 In 2006, the 
 
17  Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportu-
nity of Our Time, London: Allen Lane, 2004: 246. 
18  Ibid: 210. 
19  See Ronald D. Asmus, Ronald D., and Kenneth M. Pollack, “The New Transatlantic 
Project”, in: Policy Review,115 (2002):3-18; Charles Grant, Transatlantic Rifts. 
How to Bring the Two Sides Together, London: Centre for European Reform, 2003. European Integration: Challenge and Response 
  15
transatlantic partners are still in the midst of finding a new frame of mind 
that defines their future partnership in the management of global affairs. 
But in most places it has become evident that whenever transatlantic rela-
tions are in bad shape, also European integration suffers.  
The most important adaptation crises in transatlantic relations were inter-
woven with the most important adaptation crises and defining periods in 
European integration. The time span 1945 to 1957 and the time span 1989 
to 2004 (and, to be more precise: 2004+) have been as critical for transat-
lantic relations as they were for European integration. 
Between 1949 and 1957 three complex adaptation crises amalgamated, be-
fore they finally defined both the new European and the new transatlantic 
architecture:  
•  The Cold War and Soviet expansionism - followed by the wars in Korea 
and Indochina as well as the Suez Crises that made France and Great 
Britain painfully realize the limits of their global role - facilitated the 
American guarantee for Europe’s security.  
•  Functional European integration through the Community of Coal and 
Steel turned out to be the highly successful way of matching a host of 
conflicting integration ideas and national interests of rebuilding Western 
Europe as a society of affluence and freedom, based on a law-based 
Single Market.  
•  NATO as the strategic and military insurance policy for rebuilding 
Western Europe, the Council of Europe as a loose community of Euro-
pean values and the European Economic Community as the first step to 
political integration in Europe mutually reinforced a new and sustain-
able European peace order. 
Between 1989 and 2004 again three decisive and interconnected adaptation 
crises shaped the future path of European integration and of the Atlantic 
community, although we are not yet certain about all components of the 
outcome, because, structurally speaking, “2004” continues as an overly 
long year in 2006 and most likely beyond: Ludger Kühnhardt 
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•  The introduction of the EURO opened the perspective of currency parity 
between EURO and dollar. The underlying recognition of more or less 
economic parity between the US and the EU has been evident, for ex-
ample, throughout trade negotiations in recent years, although the statis-
tics of unemployment, growth and productivity still speak a different 
language. 
•  In spite of serious doubts and premature obituaries, the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions with 26 NATO members and 25 EU members, both antici-
pating further enlargements, have not lost their role in the projection of 
stability beyond the Atlantic area. Their role remains unique in a world 
facing enormous opportunities as a result of globalization, but also seri-
ous new threats emanating from failed states, natural and man-made 
disasters, the modernization crisis of the Greater Middle East, the terror-
ist threat of Islamic totalitarianism, and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. 
•  The “Internal Cold War of the West” over Iraq between 2002 and 2004 
was more troublesome than the fallout of the four Wars of Yugoslavian 
Succession and differences about Russia’s political system and Russia’s 
role in the Caucasus.
20 But ultimately, the transatlantic partners had to 
recognize their mutual dependency. In 2006, the conflict over Iran’s nu-
clear ambitions seems to support this healing process that has been well 
under way since 2004, an unfinished year also for transatlantic relations.  
I do not want to overstretch the exercise of conceptualizing time-lines and 
analogies. Some will be debatable or could even be implausible. Surely, it 
did not take my arguments to raise awareness for the link between defining 
periods in European and transatlantic adaptation crises. But defining peri-
ods they were, after all, because challenges were ultimately transformed 
into opportunities – or are still in the process of being transformed. This 
insight would certainly not come as a surprise to a Chinese. In their lan-
guage, so I understand, they use the same characters for crisis and opportu-
nity (wei ji).  
 
20  See Philip H. Gordon/Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the War 
in Iraq, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004.  European Integration: Challenge and Response 
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